


Today's Presentation

- Norovirus (NoV) Biology
- NoV Epidemiology
- Clinical Features
- Why are NoV outbreaks such a problem in healthcare settings?
- Cruise Ship issues
- "Controlling" Healthcare NoV Outbreaks
- What can we do to prevent NoV outbreaks?


NoV Biology

- 1968 Gastroenteritis in school children Norwalk, Ohio
- 1971 Cell free filtrates reproduce disease in prisoners
- · Hundreds of strains
- · Human infection only



What NoV really looks like





NoV Epidemiology (General)

- Continuously evolving strains Error prone RNA Recombination between strains
- · Influenza like worldwide
- Fluctuations in disease due to major (2-4 yrs. and minor (continuous) changes in antigenic structure
- · Some winter peaks in temperate climates

NoV Epidemiology – Sporadic Cases

- Rarely a true "foodborne illness"
- Virus does not live in food
- Most cases Fresh foods served uncooked contaminated by food handlers whose hands are contaminated by NoV due to symptomatic or asymptomatic infection
- Exceptions:
 - Shell fish or drinking water contaminated by sewage




NoV Epidemiology – Sporadic Cases


Royal Marines help north Wales catering students beat the bugs in the kitchen The Royal Navy and Royal Marines Chef Display Team today (Tuesday, January 27th)


The key reason food gets contaminated




What's wrong in this Picture?










NoV Clinical Features


Complications:


- Necrotizing enterocolitis infants
- Seizures in children Japan
- Chronic colitis in immunosupressed hosts
- · Mortality well recognized but host dependent


NoV Epidemiology - Outbreaks


- Hospitals
- Extended Care Facilities
- Cruise Ships
- Schools
- Day Care Centers
- Restaurants
- Hotels
- Concert Halls
- · Military instillations


















"We have limited knowledge of the study's methodology and we are unable to reconcile its conclusions with the industry's rigorous public health and sanitation procedures and with the excellent vessel sanitation scores our lines receive from the CDC. We have reached out to the authors to learn more about how the study was done...." Serendipity happens only if you are there for it







A Webber Training Teleclass Hosted by Paul Webber paul@webbertraining.com www.webbertraining.com



Why are NoV outbreaks such a problem in healthcare settings?

- 10. New strains continuously evolving
- 9. No long-term immunity
- 8. No vaccine
- 7. HCW spread one to many
- 6. Shedding precedes illness
- 5. Extended shedding
- 4. ABHR have limited impact
- 3. Disinfection issues
- · 2. Infective dose extremely small
- 1. Environmental survival

"Controlling" Healthcare NoV Outbreaks

PROBLEM

No evidence based intervention has yet be shown to be effective

What about bleach?

What about bleach?

Much more potent in lab than other disinfectants against NoV Several studies have shown slight clinical impact (in comparison to discordant controls)

No studies have evaluated confounders – For example - Prevalence density

Intensity and thoroughness of cleaning while using bleach has never been evaluated.

For example:

If thoroughness of cleaning is at 30% and does not change will you see an impact of bleach? If thoroughness of cleaning is at 30% and increases to 80% when bleach implemented and NoV in the environment significantly decreased ... was it the bleach? Was it the improved cleaning? Was it both? Outbreaks are outbreaks and by definition are finite.

What about bleach?

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For example:

- A. If thoroughness of cleaning is at 30% and does not change will you see an impact of bleach?
- B. If thoroughness of cleaning is at 30% and increases to 80% when bleach implemented and NoV in the environment significantly decreased ... was it the bleach? Was it the improved cleaning? Was it both?
- Outbreaks are outbreaks and by definition are finite.

"Controlling" Healthcare NoV Outbreaks

High index of suspicion

Reminders to HCW when outbreaks in community

(Rapid Testing) - Soon

Cohorting ill patients

Personnel control

Remain out of work if ill + 72 hours - Need strong administrative support Return to work 48 hours? 72 hours? More?

"Controlling" Healthcare NoV Outbreaks

- Soap and water H.H. Clearly better than ABHR
- Glove use for all patient contact during outbreak?
- Mobile and shared fomite control
- Close to admissions or isolate new admissions?
- Restrict Patient movement ?
- Environmental cleaning
- Disinfectant bleach recommended. Other?
- Focus on major fomites
 (forget the clocks)


Are gloves the answer?



The serial transfer of Human NoV by fecal contaminated (1:5 dilution on toilet tissue) by fingertips

Nice for the HCW.....But


Barker J. J Hosp Infect 2004.




"Controlling" Healthcare NoV Outbreaks

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"Controlling" Healthcare NoV Outbreaks

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
What can we do to prevent NoV outbreaks?


What can we do to prevent NoV outbreaks?

The Problem

NoV infections "happen" No vaccine No early diagnosis (yet) No confirmed means to "control" an outbreak once recognized **Any Ideas???**


Head for the Moon?









If these are not attractive options... we have no choice but to....








In general most hospitals and other healthcare settings are not well cleaned


















Approaches to Programmatic Environmental Cleaning Monitoring Conventional Program Advantages Enhanced Program Advantages Direct evaluation of practice An established model Uses a standardized, consistent, objective and uniform system of monitoring Provides regular and ongoing performance results to ES staff

results to ES staff Facilitates the monitoring of many data points to optimize performance analysis Provides positive practice based feedback to ES staff Allows for objective remedial interventions Easily adaptable to existing PI modalities Easily adaptable to existing PI modalities Facilitates compliance with JCAHO standards Facilitates compliance with CMS CoP Intrinsic internal benchmarking External benchmarking, reporting and recognition feasible

Carling PC, Bartley JM. AJIC (In-press)



Carling PC, Bartley JM. AJIC (In-press)

Approaches to Programmatic Environmental Cleaning Monitoring onal Program Limitations Enhanced Program Limitations **Conventional Program Limitations** Inability to evaluate actual practice Requires a new program Based only on negative outcome analysis implementation Limited generalizability of findings Ongoing administrative support Poor specificity and low sensitivity critical to success Subjectivity with a high potential for observer Potential resistance to objective monitoring and reporting

Poor programmatic specificity

Potential for observer bias Only evaluates daily HP Unable to support JCAHO standard EC. 04.01.03.EP2

Limited ability to demonstrate compliance with CMS CoP 482.42 Benchmarking not feasible

Carling PC, Bartley JM. AJIC (In-press)

While useful, the covert baseline

implement effectively

Potential monitoring tool issues

evaluation may be difficult to

Conclusions

- It is very likely that surfaces in the Patient Zone are highly relevant in the transmission of Healthcare Associated Pathogens.
- While optimizing hand hygiene and isolation practice are clearly important, there is no reason why the effectiveness and thoroughness of environmental hygienic cleaning should not also be optimized, particularly since such an intervention can be essentially resource neutral.



THE	NEXT FEW TELECLASSES
22 June 10	(British Teleclass) Patient Hand Hygiene – Perceptions & Behaviour Speaker: Emma Burnett, Tayside Hospital, Dundee
24 June 10	Infection as a Risk Factor for Chronic Disease Speaker: Dr. Allison Aiello, University of Michigan
15 Jul. 10	(<i>Free Teleclass</i>) Forever the Unknown: The Lujo Virus Experience in Johannesburg South Aftica Speaker: Prof. Adriano Duse, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa
29 Jul. 10	(Free Teleclass) Addressing Infection Prevention & Control in Low Resource Settings: The IFIC Approach Speaker: Dr. Michael Borg, St. Luke's Hospital, Malta
12 Aug. 10	(<i>Free Teleclass</i>) Positive Deviance: Unleashing Secret Change Agents in Your Hospital to Prevent MRSA Infection Speaker: Dr. Jon Lloyd, Plexus Institute
02 Sep. 10	(Free South Pacific Teleclass Live Broadcast from the NDICN Conference, New Zealand) Measuring the Impact of Infection Control
www.webbertraining.com.schedulep1.php	